In an unprecedented breach of trust at Foggy Bottom, the U.S. State Department has been rocked by a sophisticated embezzlement scheme that siphoned more than $650,000 from its diplomatic coffers. Levita Almuete Ferrer—also known professionally as Levita Brezovic—a 64-year-old senior budget analyst in the Office of the Chief of Protocol, has admitted guilt to federal charges of theft of government property. Her guilty plea, entered this week in federal court in Washington, D.C., exposes serious lapses in financial oversight within one of America’s most prominent foreign-policy institutions. Over a two-year span, Ferrer exploited her check-signing authority and digital accounting knowledge to funnel exactly $657,347.50 into personal accounts—all while meticulously falsifying records to evade detection.
1. A Two-Year Fraud, Uncovered
1.1 Scope and Scale
Between March 2022 and April 2024, Ferrer systematically wrote 60 checks from an official State Department account into her own bank accounts, on top of three additional checks made out to a confidant. Each transaction, carried out in amounts carefully calibrated to avoid immediate red flags, culminated in more than $650,000 diverted away from the government’s diplomatic mission budget. To appreciate the magnitude, consider that this sum could have underwritten the annual salary for multiple entry-level Foreign Service officers or funded a small U.S. consulate’s operational costs for an entire year.
1.2 Methodical Execution
Prosecutors detail how Ferrer personally printed, signed, and deposited each check—bypassing any co-signatures or secondary approvals typically required for large disbursements. She then used her working knowledge of the department’s QuickBooks ledgers to conceal her tracks: after physically issuing a check in her name, she returned to the digital system and replaced her name with that of an approved vendor, effectively disguising the outflows as legitimate payments for protocol services.
2. The Mechanics of Deception
2.1 Exploiting Signature Authority
As a senior budget analyst, Ferrer held signature authority over a dedicated diplomatic funds account. While her role necessitated autonomy to process time-sensitive protocol expenses, the absence of periodic co-signing or electronic alerts created a single-point-of-failure: one individual with unchecked control could authorize—and conceal—unauthorized payments without immediate scrutiny.
2.2 QuickBooks Cover-Up
Digital records often provide the audit trail that catches embezzlers. Yet Ferrer’s scheme capitalized on a critical gap: QuickBooks allowed post-issuance edits to payee fields. By deliberately printing checks under her own name and then retroactively editing them to appear as payments to a bona fide vendor, she duped routine auditors reviewing the software’s reports. Unless auditors cross-referenced printed check images against bank statements, the fraud remained hidden in plain sight.
2.3 Exploiting Human Oversight
Cybersecurity consultant Rafael Moreno explains, “This isn’t rocket science—it’s understanding the disconnect between virtual records and physical transactions. Ferrer guaranteed the digital ledgers looked squeaky clean, knowing that most finance officers wouldn’t compare ledger entries line-by-line against voided check stubs, especially in a high-volume diplomatic office.”
3. The Office of the Chief of Protocol: A Prestigious, Vulnerable Target
3.1 Strategic Importance
The Office of the Chief of Protocol orchestrates every aspect of foreign-leader visits to the United States. From arranging state dinners and accreditation of diplomats to managing Blair House—the President’s guesthouse—this office administers millions of dollars in taxpayer funds every year. Its work is front and center in the conduct of U.S. diplomacy.
3.2 Trust and Responsibility
Ferrer’s role placed her at the epicenter of this high-profile division. As a senior budget analyst, her responsibilities included forecasting costs, reviewing invoices, and ensuring that protocol expenditures adhered to appropriations and host-country agreements. Her actions thus pierced the core of the department’s public image: a trusted, respected institution charged with representing American values abroad.
4. Profile of the Perpetrator: Who Is Levita Ferrer?
4.1 Career Trajectory
Though details of Ferrer’s early career remain sealed, court filings confirm that she had decades of experience ascending through federal financial management ranks. Senior budget analysts typically possess advanced degrees in accounting or public administration, alongside years of progressively responsible roles—first as junior accountants, then as supervisory budget officers. Ferrer’s position signified both technical expertise and unwavering trust from her superiors.
